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39, 40

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

)

CAROL JEAN SHAW,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

)
)

vs.

Case No: 18367
)

HAROLD ELIJAH SHAW,
)

Defendant and
Respondent.

)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT
ST ATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff was divorced from defendant October 11, 1978.

(R-216 to 219).

The

decree awarded plaintiff the home with the provision defendant be paid his Y2 equity upon
her remarriage, provided for payment of $75.00 per month for each of five children living
with her, provided that the defendant should have the tax deduction for the dependants,
and provided for the payment of $125.00 per month alimony to be paid for a period of
three years. Twenty one months later plaintiff remarried. Defendant terminated alimony
payments and plaintiff commenced an action to recover $1,87 5.00 alimony for the balance
of the prescribed three years, to recover for certain delinquencies in the payment of child
support, moved to amend the decree to increase the child support, moved to allow the
plaintiff to have the tax deductions for the dependant children, and sought to recover
certain personal property awarded to her but still in the defendant's possession. (R-221 to
223, 267 to 268, 313 to 317).
Defendant, contending that the intent of the parties was for the alimony to cease
upon remarriage of the plaintiff, moved to have the decree amended to specifically

1
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provide for such termination, and opposed all other elements of the plaintiff's order to
show cause and motions. (R-246 to 266, 326 to 331). Both parties asked to be awarded
attorney fees, and defendant, just two days before the trial, moved to have the court
determine the equity and order a division of the proceeds of the sale of the home which
had been sold after the remarriage of the plaintiff. (R-326 to 331).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, December 18, 1982.
At the conclusion of the trial the court denied the plaintiff's claim for the full three years
of alimony as provided in the decree and determined that the alimony ceased upon
plaintiff's remarriage. The court also denied the plaintiff's claim that support payments
for one son, Neil, who had decided to live with his father when plaintiff remarried, should
continue until the decree had been modified to eliminate further support; denied the
plaintiff's request for an increase in the support award from $7 5.00 per month per child
for the three children still living with her; declined to modify the decree to allow the
plaintiff to claim the said three children for income tax purposes; and ordered the return
to the plaintiff of certain minor items of personal property still in the defendant's
possession. (T-172 to 197, R-361 to 375).
The court ruled that the money received from the sale of the home should be
disbursed between the parties after certain adjustments back and forth were made for fixup expenses, unpaid child support, rental payments and etc. Plaintiff's counsel was asked
to prepare the findings, conclusions, and judgment, and to submit them to plaintiff's
counsel for approval. (T-172 to 197, R-361 to 375).
For reasons which will be more fully explained in the Statement of Facts, and in the
arguments to follow, defendant's proposed findings, conclusions, and judgment were
submitted to the court without the approval of the plaintiff, and plaintiff's own proposals
were rejected by the court. Plaintiff thereupon obtained a one month extension of time
to April 4, 1982, in which to file her notice of appeal, (R-376 to 378) and then filed a

2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

motion to vacate findings, conclusions and judgment. (R-399 to 401). Again for reasons
that will be more fully explained hereafter, neither plaintiff nor her counsel appeared for
the hearing which was set by the court for April 5, and which was three days after she had
actually filed her notice of appeal. (R-419).
As a result, the court made and entered certain special findings of facts and
conclusions of law, (R-473 to 478) and a supplemental order on order to show cause, (R453 to 455), in which the court (a) found that plaintiff and her counsel had willfully failed
to show up at the hearing, (b) found that they had imposed upon the court and opposing
counsel, (c) attempted to revoke or condition the extension of time to file the notice of
appeal which had been signed more than one month earlier, (d)

denied the plaintiff's

motions, and (e) awarded $390.00 attorney's fees to the defendant based upon the spurious
finding that the plaintiff and her lawyer husband (who is not counsel in this case) were
engaged in a "deliberate effort to try to break the defendant financially, and to use their
legal position to punish the defendant". (T-11, R-477, 478).
Plaintiff immediately upon learning of the intended order of the court filed various
motions and affidavits objecting to the said proposed order which the court rejected out
of hand upon the ground (among others) that it would not act while the matter was on
appeal. (R-456 to 457, 472).
Plaintiff in intervention, Robert L. Lord, filed his motion to intervene, (R-485 to
487), with supporting affidavits and etc., which the court again rejected out of hand upon
the ground that it would not act while the matter was on appeal. (R-472). Plaintiff in
intervention thereupon filed his own notice of appeai. (R-_____).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks the following relief:
(a) An order determining the alimony award to be an award of alimony in gross
which continues after remarriage of the plaintiff, and granting her judgment for the
balance of the unpaid alimony in the sum of $1,875.00.
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(b) An order that the child support for the minor son Neil who went to live with his
father August 1, 1980, should continue to accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff until Neil
reached his majority August 5, 1981, and granting her judgment therefor in the sum of
$900.00.
(c) An order increasing the child support for the three minor children still living
with the plaintiff from $75.00 per month per child to $200.00 per month per child, and
providing for a cost of living escalator.
(d) An order allowing the plaintiff to claim the tax deduction for the said three
minor children.
(e) An order properly apportioning the proceeds from the sale of the parties home,
and giving the plaintiff the proper credits for her offsets, costs, and etc.
(f) An order vacating all Rulings, Findings, Conclusions, Orders and etc., entered by
the trial court after the plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed herein.
ST ATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed for divorce from the defendant on January 16, 1978, upon the ground
of mental cruelty. (R-199 to 201).

At that time plaintiff had the custody of the six

children born of the marriage, i.e., Richard, age 18, Dale, age 16, Neil, age 14, Troy, age
10, and the twins, Lynn and Lance, age 7. (R-199). After much correspondence back and
forth between the attorneys (T-46, 48, 93), after numerous conversations between the
parties (T-48, 49, 93,), and upon the verbal promise of the defendant that he would pay the
plaintiff $500.00 per month for three years regardless of what the stipulation said (T-104
I

to 107), a stipulation was executed by the parties and their lawyers September 28, 1978.
(R-208 to 210).
The stipulation was prepared by plaintiff's attorney, Brent West (T-89, Defendant's
Exhibit 1 (E)), executed by the parties and their attorneys (R-210), and provided (among
other things) for the payment of child support for the five minor children in the plaintiff's
custody of $75.00 per month per child (total $375.00), together with alimony of $125.00
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per month, making a total payment to the plaintiff by the defendant of $500.00 per
month. In paragraph five of the stipulation (R-209), defendant agreed that "This alimony
is to run for a period of three years, beginning October 1, 1978. At the end of that time,
the plaintiff agrees to permanently waive any future alimony."

The provisions of the

stipulation were incorporated verbatim into the conclusions of law and the decree of
divorce signed by Judge Hyde. (R-211 to 219). Although the stipulation and the decree
provided for the payment of child support for the five minor children to age 21 if they
were attending school full time (R- 209, 213, 217), no provision was made for the oldest
son Richard for the reason that he had received a call to serve a mission for the L.D.S.
Church and it was expected that he would be gone for two years or more. (T-26, 30).
At the time of the divorce, plaintiff was employed as a part time reporter earning
$150.00 per month (T-69), was receiving grants in unspecified amounts from various
agencies to help her through college (T-69), and was receiving welfare assistance. (T-69,
R-268). In addition, of course, she was receiving $500.00 per month from the defendant as
child support and alimony.

Her monthly house payment was $248.00. (R-208, T-26).

Plaintiff was actually bringing into the household by means of welfare, employment,
education grants and etc., more than $845.00 per month in addition to the $500.00 alimony
and support paid to her by the defendant (R-409, 410), but for reasons not clear from the
record, her trial counsel did not fully develop the evidence on that point.
The oldest son Rick returned home from his mission within a few months because of
illness (T-29, R-314). Plaintiff was forced to assume the full responsibility for his support
inasmuch as the defendant refused to contribute anything.

(T-29).

Defendant also

retreated to the letter of the stipulation and the decree of divorce at the earliest
opportunity. Although he had promised the plaintiff that he would pay her $500.00 per
month for three years (T-29), he immediately reduced the support by $7 5.00 per month
when Dale reached 18 years of age and finished high school.
Exhibit 5, page 4).

,

(T-29, 30, Defendant's

After his remarriage, defendant invaded the plaintiff's home without
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her permission and hauled off certain items of furniture and personal property which had
been awarded to the plaintiff in the original decree. (T-37, 38, R-216 to 219).
On July 1, 1980, twenty one months after the decree was signed, plaintiff married
her present husband, Robert L. Lord, a practicing attorney (T-31, R-247),

a situation

which seems to have offended the defendant, his counsel, and the trial court. See for
example T-20 line 14, Transcript of April 5 hearing - 5,

1!'

12, R-456, 457. Defendant

immediately" terminated alimony payments (T-31, R-247, 288, Defendant's Exhibit 5),
although the decree specifically provided that they were to continue for a period of three
years.
Plaintiff and Mr. Lord had purchased a home in Salt Lake City (T-34). The closing
on the home was not completed until September. (T-34). There was not sufficient room
for the plaintiff and her five dependants to move into Mr. Lord's apartment, so the two
older boys, Rick and Neil, volunteered to stay in the family home in North Ogden to watch
over it and tend the animals until it could be sold. (T-32).
During the month of July, defendant was obligated pursuant to the terms of the
divorce decree to pay plaintiff the total sum of $300.00 per month child support for the
four minor children still living with her. The decree provided that he pay $248.00 directly
to Mountain West as house payment, and the balance directly to plaintiff. (R-218). He
made the payment to Mountain West, but did not pay the remaining $52.00 to plaintiff.
(Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3, R-247). He paid it instead directly to the two boys, Rick
and Neil who were living in the North Ogden home. (Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3, R-247,
T-31, 32).

On August 1, 1980, without any prior word to their mother, Rick and Neil

moved out of the home and began living with the defendant. (Defendant's Exhibit 5, page
3, R-247, T-32, 33).
Although plaintiff was no longer living in the North Ogden home, nor receiving any
benefit therefrom, defendant made the house payment for the month of August in the
amount of $248.00 and claimed it as a credit against support, and made no payment at all
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to the plaintiff.

(Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3, T-32).

For all intents and purposes,

defendant had not paid alimony for the months of July and August, was delinquent $52.00
support for July, and delinquent for all of the support owed for the month of August.
Upon this state of facts, plaintiff, acting through her then attorney, Robert L. Lord,
commenced her action to recover support and alimony. (R-221 to 223). Defendant paid
nothing to the plaintiff for the months of September and October (Defendant's Exhibit 5,
page 3, T-32, 33), although he made the house payment to Mountain West for which he
claimed he should be credited for child support. (T-33, R-247, Defendant's Exhibit 5, page
3). He also purchased some clothing for the minor children Troy, Lynn and Lance, and
claimed he should be credited for those purchases ($166.35) as support payments also. (T32, R-288, Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3). Beginning with the month of November, 1980,
defendant resumed payments to plaintiff at the rate of $225.00 per month ($75.00 for
each of the three minor children still living with the plaintiff), once again breaching the
verbal agreement he had made with plaintiff to continue payments at the rate of $500.00
for three years. (Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3).
Defendant responded to plaintiff's affidavit and order to show cause alleging that he
had paid all of the support as due and that the alimony was intended to terminate upon
remarriage of the plaintiff.

(R-246 to 266).

He also counterattacked by claiming the

plaintiff and her husband were guilty of abuse of process designed to "harass, annoy,
threaten and coerce the defendant". (R-249). Defendant, through his attorney, continued
to attack the character, integrity, and good faith of plaintiff's husband throughout the
course of the litigation, even after he withdrew as counsel. See for example R-249, 328
paragraph 6, 329 paragraph 10, 348 paragraph 3, 383, T-20, 22, 23, 60, 98, 100, 142 to 147,
169, 170.
Under dates of November 7, 1980, plaintiff moved to modify the decree to increase
the child support, eliminate the right of the defendant to claim the children for tax
purposes, and for an award of attorney's fees.
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continuing attacks upon counsel by Mr. Thorne, and because it become apparent he would
have to be a witness for the plaintiff, Mr. Lord associated Mr. Ronald R. Stanger of Provo
as co-counsel.

(R-295, 296).

Mr.

Stanger entered his appearance for the record

December 8, 1980. (R-311).
In the summer of 1981, defendant, taking his que from the comments and pleadings
filed by Mr. Thorne, filed a complaint with the Bar Commission (T-99), accusing Mr. Lord
of unethical practice of law for reasons that have never been made entirely clear. Mr.
Lord thereupon withdrew August 14, 1981 (R-312), and Mr. Stanger became sole counsel.
As the time for trial approached, Mr.

Stanger became increasingly ill with walking

pneumonia and was unable to function (R-416, 417), and he asked his associate Mr. Jay
Fitt to conduct the trial.

(R-416, 417).

Mr. Stanger assumed responsibility for

proceedings after the trial (R-417), but was still ill and unable to attend to his full
responsibilities. (R-417).
Presumably for that reason, he did not approve or disapprove the defendant's
proposed findings, conclusions, and order prior to their entry by the court, nor did he
submit the plaintiff's proposed version on time to have them considered by the court, and
it became necessary to file a motion to vacate the orders of the court (R-399 to 401), and
for entry of plaintiff's proposed orders. (R-402 to 415).
Mr. Stanger applied for and obtained an extension of time to April 4, 1982, in which
to file the notice of appeal (R-376 to 378, 480, 481), mailed the motion to vacate on
March 14, (R-399 to 401, 481), and then withdrew. (R-380). Mr. Ronald C. Barker then
entered his appearance as counsel for the plaintiff on March 18, 1982, requested an oral
hearing on plaintiff's motion to vacate and etc., (R-379), and promptly came down with
the flu which incapacitated him to a greater or lesser extent from March 16, 1982 until
the first part of April. (R-465, 482). Mr. Barker, however, feeling it to be better strategy
not to proceed with the motions, (R-466, 482),caused a notice of appeal to be filed April
2, 1982. (R-419).
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In the meantime, the court appearently set the plaint if f's motions down for oral
hearing on April 5, and notified Mr. Barker's office by telephone on or about March 25
while Mr. Barker was in bed with the flu. (R-456, 465, 482). Neither plaintiff, nor her
husband were aware of the hearing. (R-466 paragraph 7, 483). Because of some confusion
about the hearing on the part of plaintiff's counsel (R-465 to 467, 482), neither plaintiff
nor her counsel showed up for the hearing on April 5, whereupon the court made certain
rulings and entered the special findings of fact and conclusions of law (R-473 to 478), and
the supplemental order on order to show cause (R-453 to 455), from which plaintiff
appeals.
POINT I
THE LUMP SUM ALIMONY AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF IS PAYABLE IN FULL REGARDLESS OF HER REMARRIAGE.
APPLICABLE FACTS. Plaintiff was divorced from defendant October 11, 1978. (R216 to 219). The decree awarded alimony to the plaintiff in the sum of $125.00 per month
for a period of three years. The parties had by stipulation settled their alimony, support,
and property rights, and the stipulation was incorporated verbatim into the decree.
Paragraph five of the stipulation

(R-209), of the conclusions of law (R-214), and the

decree (R-218), provided as follows:
"The defendant further agrees to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $125.00
per month as and for alimony. This alimony is to run for a period of three
years, beginning October 1, 1978. At the end of that time, the plaintiff agrees
to permanently waive any future alimony."
Defendant made the monthly payments for twenty-one months until July of 1980, at
which time plaintiff remarried. (T-31, R-247, Defendant's Exhibit 5). Defendant made no
further alimony payments contending that they were to terminate upon remarriage. (R247, 248, T-31, 113, Defendant's Exhibit 5). Plaintiff thereafter brought her order to show
cause seeking to hold the defendant in contempt for failure to pay alimony and seeking
judgment for the past due amounts. (R-221 to 223).
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LUMP SUM ALIMONY AWARD FOR A SPECIFIC SUM CANNOT BE MODIFIED. It
is abundently clear from the decree in this case that the plaintiff was awarded a specific
and fixed amount of alimony, i.e., $125.00 for three years, which calculates out to be
$4,500.00C) Nowhere in the decree, the conclusions, nor in the stipulation upon which the
decree is based, is there any mention nor hint that the alimony is to terminate upon
remarriage of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, the alimony must be paid in full,
regardless of the marital status of the plaintiff. The rule is stated in 24 Am. Jur. 2d. p.
785 as follows:
"If the divorce court awards alimony in gross, or in a lump sum, without
reserving the power to amend, the court cannot modify the provision, even
where it is payable in installments. Even though a statute expressly authorizes
the divorce court to amend or revise the decree or to make a new decree for
alimony, the court cannot modify a decree for alimony in gross."

On page 735, the Am. Jur annotator makes the following unqualified statement
Cl

regarding alimony in gross or lump sum alimony:
"Alimony in gross, or 'lump-sum alimony', is fundamentally the award of a
definite sum of money; and if the sum is payable in installments the payments
run for a definite length of time. The sum is payable in full, regardless of
future events such as the death of the husband or the remarriage of the wife.
Gross alimony becomes a vested right from the date of the rendition of the
judgment, and the manner of its payment in no wise affects its nature or
ef feet. The fact that the award is payable in installments is not determinative
of the question whether it is gross or periodic alimony. On the other hand,
alimony in general, or installment alimony, contemplates periodic payments of
a definite sum for the indefinite future, and terminates on the death of either
party or the remarriage of the wife." (Emphasis added.)
This question is annotated in 127 A.L.R., 241-247, where the principle is again
reiterated-"Thus, as pointed out in the prior annotation (71 A.L.R., 728), if alimony in a
lump sum, or 'in gross' is given, subsequent modification is not usually permitted." Nor is
there any problem with the fact that no specific sum is named in the decree inasmuch as
it is fixed and definite as to time and can, therefore, be calculated with certainty.
"Where alimony is awarded as monthly payments to be made for a limited
period of time, the court has been held not to have the power to modify the
award by requiring monthly payments for an additional time, and in this
connection it has been said that the alimony actually allowed is alimony in
gross, even though the decree does not purport to award a gross sum payable in
installments." (24 Am. Jur. 2d. p. 786).
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

For example, in the case of Edgar vs. Edgar (Mich.), 115 NW2d. 286, it was held that
an award of $125.00 per month for two years constituted a lump sum award and could not
be modified.
LUMP SUM ALIMONY AW ARD CONSTITUTES JUDGMENT LIEN IN UT AH..

The

Utah Court has long recognized the principle. In Beesley vs. Badger (Utah, 1925), 240 P.
458, the plaintiff Beesley had purchased some real property from the defendant Badger
and taken title by warranty deed. Badger had previously been divorced and was ordered to
pay permanent (indeterminate) alimony and $80.00 per month child support. Although
there was no allegation that he was in arrears, the plaintiff maintained that the decree
was a final in personum judgment and constituted a lien against the real property of the
defendant (and, therefore, a violation of the covenant in the warranty deed) by virtue of
the judgment lien statute.

The court, recognizing the difference between a lump sum

award and an award of an indeterminate or indefinite amount, and referring to its
previous quotes from 19 C.J. p. 313, held as follows:
"When no such lien is declared or impressed by the decree itself, we, from
the texts and the cases there cited, and from the statute, deduce and declare
this to be the rule: When a divorce is granted and the husband ordered to pay
alimony or to support minor children or both, /and the decree itself does not
declare or impress a lien to secure such payments, then, by force of the
statute relating to judgments in general, such decree or judgment from the
filing and docketing thereof becomes and has all the force and ef feet of a lien
to the same extent as an ordinary judgment for money, when the decree for
alimony is in a gross sum, though payable partly or wholly in future
installments, and when not a gross sum but, as here, in installments for an
indefinite period, the decree is a lien securing payment of all due and unpaid
installments, but not of installments to become due in the future." (Emphasis
added).
The court said that a judgment or decree awarding alimony in gross, even though
payable in future installments is a judgment for a sum certain and would constitute a lien
upon the real property of the obligor, and went on to expound upon the diff ere nee between
a lump sum award which would constitute a lien, and periodic alimony with no termination
date which would not constitute a lien. The obvious premise throughout the argument is
that the lump sum award is final and fixed for a specific amount, and hence not subject to
modification at a later date.
11
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LUMP SUM ALIMONY AWARD DOES NOT TERMINATE UPON RE- MARRIAGE IN
UTAH. In the case of Austad vs. Austad (Utah, 1954), 2 Utah 2d. 40, 269 P.2d. 284, this
court had before it the question of whether indeterminate alimony (or alimony for an
indefinite amount) automatically terminated upon the remarriage of the wife.

In

overruling the case of Myers vs. Myers (62 Utah 90, 218 P. 123), which had held that
alimony did not automatically terminate upon remarriage the court reasoned thusly:
"The case of King vs. King (38 Ohio St. 370), is important to the problem
we are considering. It seems to present the real situation from which the
Myers rule originated. There the award was for a lump sum of $1,000.00 as
permanent alimony, payable in monthly installments. It was held that the
remarriage did not cut off the wife's right to receive the full amount of the
award even though some of the installments remained to be paid after the
subsequent marriage. This rule is perfectly sound and logical when applied to
the facts in the King case, but the error apparently has come about in applying
it where the award was not for a lump sum but merely for indefinite current
support. The clear distinction which obviously exists between these two
situtions has received judicial recognition. The courts of Illinois and Georgia
hold that where the alimony is in a lump sum payable in installments there is
no automatic termination on the wife's remarriage; and that this creates an
absolute right to the amount so awarded, but indicate that where the alimony
is strictly for the current support of the wife, without limit as to the total
amount or the number of installments, remarriage of the wife automatically
ends her right to such alimony. This distinction is also suggested in the
Oklahoma case of Gilcrease vs. Gilcrease." (Emphasis added). For cases
referred to in the above quote, recognizing the distinction, see Dobson vs.
Dobson, 320 Ill. App. 687, 51 N.E. 2d. 1010; Morgan vs. Lowman, 80 Ill. App.
557; Green vs. Starling, 203 Ga. 10, 45 S.E.2d. 188; White vs. Murden, 190 Ga.
536, 9 S.E.2d. 745; Gilcrease vs. Gilcrease, 186 Okl. 451, 98 P.2d. 906, 127
A.L.R., 735.
From the foregoing analysis, the court held that alimony for an indefinite amount
automatically terminated upon remarriage of the wife, and made the following comment:
"In reaching this decision we are not to be understood as holding that the same result
would eventuate where a sum of alimony was decreed in lieu of dower, or in settlement of
property rights, or where the alimony is awarded in a lump sum payable in installments." (Emphasis added).
Without further elaboration, it seems abundently clear that the rule in the State of
Utah is that periodic alimony for an indefinite term automatically terminates upon the
remarriage of the wife, but that alimony awarded in gross either for a specific amount or
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for a definite and stated length of time (which is the same thing) is payable in full even
though some installments remain to be paid after the remarriage of the wife. In this case
defendant owes plaintiff an additional fifteen months of alimony at $125.00 per month, or
a total of $1,875.00.
DECREE IS FINAL AND CANNOT BE MODIFIED FOR PRESUMED CLERICAL OR
JUDICIAL ERROR. There remains one additional issue that should be addressed in regard
to this point. After the plaintiff had commenced her post judgment action to enforce the
alimony and support obligations of the defendant, defendant, on October 29, 1980, more
than two years after the entry of the decree, filed his amended response, (R-246 to 266)
wherein he, for the first time in this action, called into question the alimony provision of
the October, 1978 decree. On pages 249 and 250 of the record, defendant seeks to amend
the decree on the basis of a clerical ert:'or under Rule 60 (a), or to "Reform" the decree to
conform to the understanding of the parties. The matter was tried to the court on this
issue over the objections of the plaintiff. (T-44, 45, 103).
It is clear that the trial court erred in taking any evidence on this point over the
objections of the plaintiff, and that he was just as obviously in error when he amended the
judgment nunc pro tune to provide that the alimony should cease upon remarriage of the
plaintiff. 46 Am. Jur. 2d. at page 318 states that the obvious purpose of a judgment is to
"show the litigants and other persons interested in the cause that the judge has arrived at
a decision, and what that decision is; it is this reflection of the judge's state of mind that
makes the judgment effective."
Rule 60 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "clerical mistakes" in
judgments may be corrected at any timee Rule 60 (b) provides for all other instances in
which a party may obtain relief from a final judgment. The defendant simply does not fit
into either category. The case of Richards vs. Siddoway (Utah, 1970), 24 Utah 2d. 314,
471 P.2d. 143, is controlling and dispositive on this point. In that case seven of eight heirs
of one William H. Siddoway, deceased, had entered into a stipulation for the partition of
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the real property of the deceased. The stipulation apparently provided that the fee simple
to a portion of the land should be awarded to three of the heirs, and that the fourth should
take a life estate with remainder over to his only child, Elaine.

During his lifetime,

Elaine's father conveyed away his interest in the land. After his death Elaine brought suit
to establish her life estate in the land and to recover possession. The defendants moved
to correct a "clerical error" in the judgment and to amend the judgment to grant the fee
to Elaine's father (thereby depriving her of her life estate) upon the ground that that was
the intention of the signatories on the stipulation.

The court took testimony and

apparently found that to be the intention of the parties and granted the motion to amend
the judgment nunc pro tune. Plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, Justice Ellett, writing for the unanimous court, and referring to 49
C.J.S., Judgments Section 238, held that after the time provided in Rule 60 (b) the
judgment was no longer open to "any amendment, revision, modification, or correction
which involves the exercise of the judgment or discretion of the court on the merits or on
matters of substance."
"The only amendment then permissible is one which is intended to make
the judgment speak the truth by showing what the judicial action really was,
and not one which corrects judicial errors, or remedies the'effects of judicial
nonaction; the court has no power at such time to revise and amend a
judgment by correcting judicial errors, and making it express something which
the court did not pronounce, and did not intend to pronounce, in the first
instance. Judicial errors in judgments are to be corrected by appeal or writ of
error, or by certiorari, or by awarding a new trial, or by any means specially
provided by statute, and not by amendment, unless the statute permits such
amendment."
The court then went on to point out that the distinction between a judicial error and
a clerical error does not depend upon who made it, but, rather, it depends upon whether it
was made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. It pointed
out that in that case, the judgment as rendered, even if it should be at variance with the
intention of the parties, or even of the stipulation itself, could not be amended as a

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

clerical error since it obviously was the judgment of the court no matter how erroneously
it may have been made.
The court stated that the only remedy open to the defendants was to make the
appropriate motions under the then equivalent of Rule 60 (b) which at that time provided
that the motions must be made within a reasonable time of not more than six months
after rendition of the judgment. Inasmuch as they had not done so the court had no
jurisdiction after that time to vacate the order.
"By numerous decisions of this court it is settled that a judgment, not void
on its face, cannot in the same proceedings by motion, be opened or vacated
by the court which rendered it, except within six months after the adjournment of the term at which the judgment was rendered. * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * *
"The rule applicable is wholesome and necessary. There must be an end to
the time when judgments can be questioned.
"In this case the protestant had a remedy by motion for a new trial and
also by appeal, but she permitted the time limited by law therefore to lapse
without seeking either. Nearly a year after the adjournment of the term at
which the proceedings were had, she, by a motion, attempted to avoid the
judgment upon extrinsic grounds. It is a case plainly within the rule which
denies jurisdiction of a court to open or vacate its judgments under such
circumstances."
APPLICATION TO PLAINTIFF. So also in this case. Defendant Harold Shaw and his
attorney executed the Stipulation (R-208 to 210), upon which the decree of divorce was
based. The provisions of the stipulation were incorporated into the Conclusions of Law
(R-211 to 215), and ultimately into the Decree of Divorce (R-216 to 219). Clearly then
the decree follows the conclusions of law, which obviously follows the stipulation.
Whatever the intention of the parties may have been, the presumed error is not a clerical
error which can be remedied under Rule 60 (a). If it is a judicial error, it could only be
remedied under Rule 60 (b) and must be brought within four months of the entry thereof.
Only the defendant and his lawyer knew of any mistake in the stipulation and they chose
not to correct it (plaintiff contends the intention was for the alimony to be paid in full
regardless of her remarriage. T-48, 49, 90, 91, 92) rather, contenting themselves only
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with correction of a minor item concerning the date of separation. (Defendant's Exhibit
"B").
POINT II
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE SUPPORT ACCRUING FOR THE MINOR CHILD NEIL
FROM THE TIME NEIL VOLUNTARILY MOVED IN WITH THE DEFENDANT
UNTIL HE REACHED HIS EIGHTEENTH BIRTHDAY (12 MONTHS).
APPLICABLE FACTS.

The divorce decree of October 11, 1978 (R-211 to 219),

provided for the payment to the plaintiff of $75.00 per month for each of the five minor
children then living with her. (R-217). Twenty two months later on August 1, 1980, (one
month after plaintiff's remarriage), one of the minor children, Neil, who turned 17 years
of age on August 5, voluntarily and without prior word to his mother, moved out of the
plaintiff's home in North Ogden, and into the home of his father, the defendant herein.
(R-247, T-32, 33, 34).
Defendant terminated further support payments for Neil as of August 1, 1980.
(Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3, R-247, T-34). By means of an order to show cause issued
September 9, 1980 (R-221 to 223), plaintiff moved to have the defendant found in
contempt and to reduce the support arrearages to judgment. Although the question of
delinquent support for Neil was not raised directly in the order or the supporting affidavit,
the issue was tried to the court without opposition from the defendant. (R-344, 365, T-19,
20, 34, 35, 52).
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FOR NEIL AS MATTER OF LAW UNTIL
DECREE IS MODIFIED. The question here presented, i.e., whether the father should be
given credit for payments made in support of minors in the legal custody of the mother
while they are living with him and presumably being supported by him, has been the
subject of endless litigation over the years. See 47 A.L.R., 3rd. 1024 et. seq., and the
cases collected therein. The 47 A.L.R., 3rd.

annotation, at page 1035 in its opening

comments makes the following observation:
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"While the subject matter of this annotation is such as to discourage the
formulation of general rules, since the particular circumstances involved
appear to be controlling in most cases, it can be generally stated that most
cases have gravitated toward the view that a father should not be allowed, as
a matter of law, credit for expenditures made while the child is in his custody
or for other voluntary payments made on behalf of the child which do not
specifically conform to the terms of the decree." (Emphasis added.)
And again, on page 1039:
"Most of the courts that have been faced with the issue of whether or not
to give a father credit against child support payment arrearages for expenses
accruing where the child was in his custody, or for other voluntary expenditures made by him on the child's behalf, have taken the position that the
father is not entitled, as a matter of law, to credit for such voluntary
expenditures when they are made in a manner other than that specified by the
support order or divorce decree." (Emphasis added.)
The annotator then cites cases in support of the proposition from Arkansas,
California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Lousiana, Maryland,
Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and
Washington.
REASONS FOR RULE. Various rationals have been given by the courts for denying
the father credit even though the child is in his home and being supported by him. Some
courts have reasoned that to permit the father credit for voluntary payments would be the
equivalent of allowing him to vary the terms of the decree at will, and to deprive the
mother of the right to determine the manner in which the support monies should be spent.
See for example, Openshaw vs.

Openshaw (1935), 86 Utah 229, 42 P .2d. 191.

Other

reasons given for the rule are that the right to the payments becomes vested when they
are due, have essentially ripened into judgment (or the right to judgments) as they become
due, and the court, therefore, has no power to modify the decree except in futuro. For
example, in the widely quoted case of Bradley vs. Fowler (Wash., 1948), 192 P .2d.

969,

the defendant had the children in his custody for a period of five weeks during which he
supported them and (in addition) expended $125.00 for medical attention and clothing etc.
The trial court and the appellate court both agreed that defendant was not relieved of his
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obligation to pay support during the five weeks that the child was in his custody· The
appellate court observed:
"We are therefore of the opinion that, under the specific provisions of the
final decree, respondent was required to pay to appellant the sum of twentyfive dollars per week during the period hereunder consideration, regardless of
the fact that he had the children in his custody."
The court went on to observe that even a court of equity, in an effort to do equity,
cannot disregard the provisions of a lawful decree, nor would the court be justified in
offsetting against payments required under the decree, voluntary payments made while
the children were in the defendant's custody.
PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS OF RULE. Among those circumstances in which the
courts have refused to allow the father credit against arrearages of child support accruing
while he had the child in his "custody" and supported him during such time, the following
are examples:
(a) Where the husband takes custody on his own initiative.

In the case of

Mccourtney vs. Mccourtney (Ark., 1943) 168 S.W.2d. 200, the court held that credit could
not be allowed to the husband for his expenses in supporting one of three children awarded
to the wife in the decree during the time he had the child in his "custody".

He had

accomplished the change of custody from the divorced wife without her consent, on his
own initiative, and contray to the order of the court.
"The court stated that the husband was not entitled to this credit for the reason that
he was a volunteer in taking this child into his custody, and that he become such when he
took the child into his custody in violation of the court order." 47 A.L.R., 3rd. at 1048,
referring to Mccourtney vs. Mccourtney.
(b) Where the husband takes the child without the consent of the mother. In the
matter of Eileen Baures vs. Jack Baures (Ariz., 1970), 478 P.2d.

130; 47 A.L.R., 3rd.

1024, the court held, inter alia, that since the wife neither expressly nor impliedly
consented to any mode of payment other than that called for in the divorce decree, the
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husband was not entitled to credit against the arrearages that accrued during the fourteen
months that the child was in his "custody".
(c) Where the mother is ill and unable to care for the child. In Boyle vs. Boyle,
(1967, Fla. App.), 194 So.2d. 64, referred to in 47 A.L.R., 3rd. at 1050, the father was not
allowed to deduct $100.00 in support that had accured while he had the child as a result of
the mother's illness. The court stated that the rule generally applied in such cases is that
when default has occurred in payment of installments of child support under a decree that
has become final, the sums unpaid constitute vested property rights which the wife cannot
be deprived of except by due process of law.
(d) Where the child prefers to live with the father. In this regard, the 47 A.L.R.,
3rd. annotation at page 1051 makes the following unqualified statement:
"Credit against child support arrearages has generally been denied for
support expense incurred by the father when the child, for one reason or
another, decides to leave the custody of the mother and live with the father.
In these cases the courts generally take the position that since such a change
in custody is without the mother's consent and in violation of the decree, the
father still remains obligated to make support payments according to the
terms of the decree, and that the father, in caring for the child in a manner
other than that specified by the decree, merely acts as a volunteer."
Of particular interest along this line is the case of Klimasewski vs. Klimasewski,
(1960, R.I.), 162 A.2d. 549. In that case the mother had been awarded custody of five
minor children and the father was ordered to pay $5.00 per week support for each of the
children.

At one time or another all five of the children went to live with the father

without the permission of the mother. During the time the father had them with him he
deducted $5.00 per week for each child in his "custody". The court refused to allow him
credit against the arrearages and held that to allow him such credit would amount to an
impermissable retroactive modification of the decree.
Compare the case of Baures vs. Baures, (Supra), holding that the father was not
entitled to credit against the arrearages which had accrued during the time he had the
child living with him.
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"A father who is required to make periodic payments for the support of
minor children has an opportunity to relieve himself of that liability by a
petition to modify the decree in futuro but he cannot remain silent while the
installments accrue and then claim credit for his voluntary acts. In view of
the mandatory requirements of the divorce decree as to payments of the
monthly installments to appellant, although it is to appellee's credit that he
cared for his daughter, he was a volunteer and is not thereby relieved from the
obligation of the decree."
THE UT AH RULE. The Utah court finds itself in good company with the majority
by refusing to allow, as a matter of law, credit to the father for expenditures made by
him to support the child during the time that he had it contrary to the terms of the
decree, or to allow any credit toward the arrearages that accrued in favor of the mother
during such time. The Utah court (along with many of the others) has not entirely closed
the door, however, where the father can show that the mother consented to the alternate
manner of payment, AND where there is no injustice to the mother, AND where the
particular circumstances otherwise so justify, credit may be allowed. See Openshaw vs.
Openshaw (1935), 86 Utah 229, 42 P .2d. 191, Anderson vs. Anderson (1946), 172 P .2d. 132,
and Stanton vs. Stanton (1974), 30 Utah 2d. 315, 517 P.2d. 1010, all refusing to allow the
father credit even though he had the "custody" of the child and supported him during the
time the arrearages accured.
In Anderson vs. Anderson, the court said:
"There is no dispute as to the fact that defendant did not fully comply
with the decree. He could not properly ignore any provisions therein pending
modification. Under the remedial powers of the court, the defendant could
have been held in contempt for wilful non-compliance with the decree. We see
no reason why the court could not likewise require him to pay a sum equal to
the installments which had been unpaid. The court was doubtless reluctant to
specifically hold defendant in contempt when the plaintiff had told him she did
not want any more money from him when she remarried. She could not waive
the right of the two children who did remain with her to be supported by
defendant as required by the decree. There is no showin that durin the three
months in controversy the total sum of 225.00 was not a reasonable sum for
the support of the two minor children, even if plaintiff's second marriage and
the voluntary departure of Gary from her home are also considered."
(Emphasis added.)
In Stanton vs. Stanton (1974), supra, a case which was ultimately before the court
three times and the United States Supreme Court twice on the question of unconstitu-
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tional discrimination where the age of majority was fixed at 18 for girls and 21 for boys,
the court continued in effect its policy of not allowing credit toward arrearages which
accrued during the time the father had the children in his home contrary to the terms of
the decree, stating:
"There is an adjunctive minor issue in this case: defendant contends that
the son Rick lived with him for about three months and that he is therefore
entitled to a credit of $300.00 for Rick's support during that time. The
general rule is that the decree fixes the obligations of the parties; and that
they cannot modify it or change their obligations by their conduct. Otherwise
sometimes interfamily tensions and mechanations could make a shambles of
determining and enforcing the rights and duties of the parties.
"In the absence of any modification of the decree, the support money
accrued in accordance with its terms; and it was not the prerogative of the
defendant to unilaterall decide that he would not a the su ort mone and
offset it by favors conferred upon the children." Emphasis added.
APPLICATION TO PLAINTIFF.

So far as the instant case is concerned, it is

apparent that Neil moved from the home in North Ogden into his father's home without
the knowledge nor consent of the plaintiff. (T-32, 33, R-247). Plaintiff did not expressly
nor impliedly consent to any form of payment at variance with the terms of the decree,
nor did the defendant take any steps to seek modification of the decree to eliminate the
support for Neil. (R-250).
Anticipating that Neil would be living with her, plaintiff purchased a home in Salt
Lake City. (T-34). Costs for mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, utilities, heat, and
other shelter costs amounted to $11,232.11 in 1981. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "G"). Whether
Neil lived there or whether he didn't made no appreciable difference in the amount of
those overhead costs. The fact that plaintiff was no longer directly supporting Neil did
not entitle defendant to a pro rata reduction in his support obligation (Anderson vs.
Anderson, supra), and the total monthly support for the three children remaining with the
plaintiff, together with the sum owing for Neil only amounts to $300.00, or $100.00 per
month per child if it is apportioned to the remaining children-certainly not an
unreasonable amount of support in any event. To deny her judgment for the very paltry
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sum of $900.00 would work a substantial injustice upon the plaintiff~ 47 A.L.R., 3rd. 1041,
paragraph 4.
POINT Ill
PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED SUFFICIENT CHANGE OF CIR CU MST ANCES TO
WARRANT INCREASE IN MONTHLY CHILD SUPPORT AWARD.
APPLICABLE FACTS. At the time of plaintiff's divorce from defendant in October,
1978, she was employed as a part time reporter earning $150.00 per month (T-69, R-365),
was receiving grants in unspecified amounts from various agencies to help her through
college (T-69), and was receiving welfare assistance.

(T-69, R-268).

In addition, of

course, she was receiving $500.00 per month from the defendant as child support and
alimony. Her monthly house payment was $248.00. (R-208, T-26). As the trial court itself
observed (T..,176), the $500.00 awarded to her was hardly enough to support her and the
five children, and it becomes apparent that the difference was made up primarily from
the welfare and other agency grants.
Defendant was earning $15,313.40 per year at the time of the divorce (R-366),
making his total contribution to the support of his family 3996 of his income. The decree
awarded the use and possession of the home to the plaintiff with the provision that it must
be sold upon her remarriage. (R-217).

On July 1, 1980, plaintiff remarried, thereby

triggering the requirement that the home be sold. (T-31, 113, R-247, Defendant's Exhibit
5, page 4). At the time the plaintiff's order to show cause was filed in September, 1980

(R-223), plaintiff and her new husband were in the process of purchasing a home in Salt
Lake City (T-34). The older son Dale had reached his majority and was no longer living
with the plaintiff (T-21, 28, 29, 51, 67), and the next older son Neil was living with his
father, having moved in with him August 1, 1980. (T-32, 33, R-247, Defendant's Exhibit 5,
page 4).

Defendant had terminated alimony payments and had terminated support for

. . Dale and Neil, leaving the plaintiff with only $225.00 per month total support for the
three younger children still living with her. (T-31, R-247, 248, Defendant's Exhibit 5, page
4).
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At the time of the hearing in December, 1981, defendant demonstrated, and the
court found, that he was earning approximately $19,000.00 per year, (R-366), or an
increase of "almost $4,000.00" as observed by the court in its ruling from the bench. (T178). The court will note that defendant was then paying only 14% of his income to the
plaintiff to support the three children still in her custody. Plaintiff, on the other hand
was spending 165% of her income to support the children. See page 30 herein. Defendant
had also remarried (T-118), claimed to be supporting two minor children of his new wife,
(T-118, Defendant's Exhibit 3), and had two of the older children (Rick and Neil who were
both over 18 years old and gainfully employed), living with him and which he claimed to be
supporting. (T-34, 35, 67, 134, Defendant's Exhibit 3).
Plaintiff, on the other hand, had graduated from college, had been employed as a
teaching intern and as a pre-school teacher and had earned a gross salary for 1981 of
$6,276.71, and a net of $5,165.16. (R-365, Plaintiff's Exhibit "A").
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED. Plaintiff contends that the trial court
misapplied the law and grossly abused its discretion by finding that there had not been a
sufficient change of

circumstan~e

to increase the support for the three children remaining

in the custody of the plaintiff. There is no question that as a general rule, there must be
some material change of circumstances since the entry of the decree of divorce in order
for the court to modify the decree. Anderson vs. Anderson, (1962), 13 Utah 2d. 36, 368
P.2d. 264; Gale vs. Gale 233 U. 277, 258 P.2d. 986. The principle is easy to enunciate,
but the application is more difficult.

The question, as always, boils down to a

determination as to what constitutes a sufficient change of circumstances. In 1981 this
court had before it the case of Foulger vs. Foulger, 626 P .2d. 412. In that case the court
observed that modifications of real property awards should be made only upon a showing
of "compelling reasons arising from substantial and material change in circumstances."
Significantly, however, on page 414 of the Pacific Reporter, the court said that the rule
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should not be as rigidly applied where modification of a support and alimony award is at
issue.
"The change in circumstance required to justify a modification of the
decree of divorce varies with the type of modification contemplated. Provision in the original decree of divorce granting alimony, child support, and the
like must be readily susceptible to alternation at a later date, as the needs
which such rovisions were desi nated to fill are sub·ect to ra id and
unpredictable change." Emphasis added.
Such a view of the circumstances under which awards of alimony and support should
be modified is entirely consistent with the view expressed by the Alabama court in the
case of Womble vs. Womble (197 5), 321 So.2d. 660:
"The conditions and circumstances of the parties, though pertinent, are
not the controlling criteria in determining the changed needs of the children.
It is the material change in the needs, conditions and circumstances of the
children that is the most pertinent in considering modification of a decree of
sup~ort. That factor coupled with the father's financial ability to meet such
nee s determines the basis for modification." (Emphasis added.)
CHANGES AND NEEDS SHOWN BY PLAINTIFF. A careful examination of the oral
testimony and the record in this matter will show that the trial court erred in almost
every particular pertaining to the change of circumstances of the parties and of the
changed needs of the children.
(a) General Increase in the Cost of Living and in the Cost of Raising the Children.
Counsel for the defendant observed that the overall cost of living had gone up and that
the court was very much aware of it. (T-78). Plaintiff's attorney, in his remarks at the
conclusion of his case in chief, and in his concluding arguments to the court asked the
court to consider the general increase in the cost of living and of the rising cost of
supporting the minor children as a result of their advancement in years, with the
attendant increase in the cost of their clothing, amount of food consumed, activities they
involve themselves in, and etc. (T-110, 164). The plaintiff asked the court to take judicial
notice of the double digit inflation throughout the general economy during the three years
since the entry of the decree, and requested a specific finding that a 3096 increase in the
cost of living does not (in line with the court's refusal to increase the support), constitute
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a sufficient change of circumstances to modify the support award. (R-413). The court
ref used to sign the proposed findings.
Numerous cases and authorities could be cited for the proposition that the court can
and should take judicial notice of matters which are within the common knowledge of an
interested public. See for example in re Marriage of Wilden (Colo., 1977), 563 P .2d. 384.
There is no question of the common knowledge of the general public that there had been
double digit inflation during the three years since the decree had been entered leading to
a general increase in the cost of living of at least 3096.

On that basis alone, the

purchasing power of $7 5.00 per child awarded to the plaintiff had been reduced by 3096 to
an equivalent in 1978 dollars of only $52.50 - a mere pittance.

Just to maintain the

purchasing power of the award as made, it would have to be increased by 3096 to $97 .50.
If there had been no evidence of need or changed circumstances of the parties at all, t!'le

court was obligated to increase the support to at least $97 .50, and failure to do so
constitutes an abuse of discreation, and creates a condition of extreme inequity for the
plaintiff. It is ridiculous in the extreme to contemplate payment (in 1978 dollars) of only
$52.50 per child for three children when the defendant was earning in 1978, over

$15,000.00 per year.
In the case of Womble vs. Womble, supra, the Alabama court had before it the wife's
petition for increase in the child support award for two children from $150.00 per month
per child. Five years had passed since the entry of the last modification in 1970, and the
defendant was earning approximately $18,000.00 per year. Evidence was submitted by the
plaintiff concerning the increased cost of raising the children. The trial court determined
that there had been no showing of a material change of circumstances beyond that
contemplated by the last modification in 1970, and refused to modify the award. The
appeals court held that it was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court not to
judicially notice the general increased level of the cost of living. The court said:
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"It is a matter for judicial recognition that the sum of $150.00 per month
has markedly lost purchasing power since 1970. It is further un.disputed t~at
because of advanced age and activity, the cost of feeding, clothing, supplying
school equipment and furnishing other needs of growing boys has increased."
See also Beck vs. Walker (Ariz., 1979), 604 P .2d. 18, wherein the court said that it
was a matter of common knowledge that the cost of living had substantially increased
since 1973, and having shown that the defendant's ability to pay had also increased, it was
proper for the court to increase the child support award. So also in this case. The overall
general increase in the cost of living since entry of the decree, in and of itself,
constitutes sufficient change of circumstances to require the trial court to increase the
level of support.
(b) Increased Housing Expense.

At the time of the divorce in 1978, plaintiff's

mortgage expense was $248.00 per month. Plaintiff remarried July 1, 1980, and, pursuant
to the terms of the decree of divorce, was required to sell the house, which she did. (T54, R-217). Prior to her remarriage, plaintiff and her soon to be husband purchased a
home in Salt Lake City for $80,000.00. (T-34, 79, 97). The home was purchased with the
expectation that the two older boys, Rick and Neil would also live with the plaintiff. (T34,80). The uncontroverted testimony of the plaintiff and her husband was to the effect
that the house was smaller than the one sold in North Ogden, had only one bedroom on the
main floor, and three bedrooms in the finished basement, and was just barely adequate for
their needs (T-79); that it was in a reasonably good middle class neighborhood (T-97); and
was the result of diligent search throughout the Salt Lake County area for suitable
housing. (T-97). Plaintiff's husband testified (T-98) that to find a house in the Salt Lake
area equivalent to the home plaintiff was forced to sell in North Ogden would cost
upwards of $120,000.00 to $130,000.00.
The uncontroverted facts showed that the plaintiff (together with her new husband)
was expending $9,660.00 per year for mortgage payments, plus an additional $1,572.11 for
heat, lights, water, telephone, and etc., for a total shelter cost of $11,232.11. (T-83 to
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86, Plaintiff's Exhibit "G"). Since there were two adults and three minor children residing
in the home, plaintiff attributed 3/ 5 of the cost to the children for a total of $6,739.26.
Defendant's total contribution amounts to only $2,700.00 per year-less than one-half of
even the shelter costs.
Much is made of the plaintiff's "voluntary" increase in living costs by the court. For
example, contrary to the evidence, the court states on page 176 of the transcript that
"While necessity may have required that they get a larger house for the children that
would be more expensive than the apartment Mr. Lord was currently renting, there is
nothing that required them, of course, to buy an $80,000.00 home by which a major
portion of this child support is added on here". Beginning on page 177 the court says: "All
of this that I am saying pursuades the court, however, that though the plaintiff's expenses
have gone up considerably, they (have) voluntarily gone up ••• " The court then goes on
to expound on how one naturally spends to the limit and cites examples of one having a
$100,000.00 income, a $50,000.00 income, a $25,000.00 income and etc., clearly implying
that remarriage to a lawyer had made plaintiff wealthy and she was spending accordingly.
It should be noted that the court had ruled that the income of the plaintiff's husband was
immaterial and would not be considered by him, and hence plaintiff's trial counsel did not
put on any evidence of the husband's depressed earnings, although he had started out to do
so. (T-86, 87).
It appears to this writer that the court has applied a double standard to the plaintiff.
The defendant may (apparently) voluntarily increase his housing costs, voluntarily marry
and take on the obligation to support his step children, voluntarily support his adult
children who were gainfully employed and fully capable of supporting themselves, increase
his other costs and expenses voluntarily, etc., and then use that as an excuse to avoid
paying even a minimumly adequate amount for the support of his own minor children.
Just how voluntary has the increase in the living expenses of the plaintiff actually
been? If she be afforded the same right of remarriage as the defendant, it follows that all
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increases ref erred to in this case pretty much follow as a matter of course, and because
of the provision in the decree which required the plaintiff to sell her home upon
remarriage. She actually had no choice in the matter, except the original choice to marry
or not to marry. Once that choice had been made, she was obligated to sell the house in
North Ogden and purchase another. Testimony clearly showed that a good faith effort had
been made to find suitable housing at an affordable price; that housing costs in the Salt
Lake area were approximately double what they were in the North Ogden area and so
forth. The court, in accordance with the principles of in re Marriage of Wilden, supra,
should take judicial notice of the steep escalation of housing costs in the Salt Lake market
as well.
An unbiased evaluation of the evidence in this matter will clearly show that the
increased housing costs of the plaintiff were reasonable, necessary, and unavoidable once
the decision to remarry had been made. Compare Keith vs. Paden, (Ala., 19 51 ), 51 So.2d.
9, wherein the court held that the loss of use of the house to the wife upon her
remarriage, together with the fact that the children in her custody were three years older
were, without more, sufficient change of circumstances to warrant an increase in the
child support award.
(c) Other Costs.

Plaintiff's uncontroverted testimony and evidence definitely

established that, in addition to basic housing costs of $6,729.36, she was spending a
minimum of $4,400.36 per year on the children, or a total of $11,139.62.

(T-83, 86,

Plaintiff's Exhibit "G"). If her mortgage payment were reduced by Y2, thereby bringing it
into line with the amount defendant is paying for housing, (Defendant's Exhibit 3), she
would still be paying $3,821.46 to purchase and maintain the home, in addition to the
$4,400.36 per year she is spending for basic necessities such as food, clothing, medical
care, and etc.

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit "G").

Even at such a reduced cost for housing

.,. (which the court said constituted the major item of increased living costs, T-176),
plaintiff's total costs for supporting the three children is $8,221.82.
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Of that amount,

defendant is only paying $2,700.00, or approximately 33% (approximately 24% if the
actual expenses of $11, 139.62 are compared), and allowed to claim the children for tax
purposes as well.
Over and above that, plaintiff supplies all of the love, caring, nurture, and etc. She
is the one who must get them to the doctor when they are sick, attend school functions,
bandage their physical and emotional hurts, see that they get their homework done, and
etc. (See Womble vs. Womble, supra).
(d) Inadequacy of Support Award.

It is abundently clear from the record and

without need for further argument, that the award of $75.00 per month for support of the
children is inadequate by any standard or test. Defendant himself testified (T-136) that it
required between $320.00 to $360.00 per month to support only one child while on his
mission in the Chicago area. The members of this court are aware that such an award
($7 5.00 per month) was a common award in the l 960's and early 70's when the average
earnings of the father were $6,000.00 to $8,000.00 per annum. The court should also take
notice of the Uniform Child Support Schedule Second Judicial District (5th revision
1/28/82) which would award a minimum amount of support for the three minor children of
$312.00 per month. See Appendix A herein.
As any practicing attorney would know, many considerations go into the provisions
of a divorce decree concerning support, alimony, and the like.

Of times the husband is

unable to provide an adequate support at the time, the needs of the children are not so
great because of their tender age, and etc. By the same token, most attorneys engaged in
the practice would likely counsel their client that as the children grow older, the income
of the father increases to the point where he could provide an adequate support, and etc.,
that the court would entertain a motion to increase the support.

Also, where actual

experience demonstrates that the award (even if considered adequate at the time) turns
out to be inadequate, the court should increase the support where the husband has the
ability to pay. See for example the case of LeBus vs. LeBus (Ky., 1966), 408 S.W.2d. 200,
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where the mother filed for an increase nine months after the divorce where her actual
experience showed that the amount of support awarded to her by stipulation, was, in fact,
inadequate. The court said that the necessary change of circumstance had been shown
when subsequent events indicated that the award of support was induced by the
misconception of the mother that she could get by on $200.00 per month per child.
The principle is applicable to the plaintiff in this case. Whatever her expectations
may have been at the time she agreed to accept $7 5.00 per month per child, plaintiff's
subsequent experience has shown that to be a wholly inadequate award. She is spending
her entire net income of $5,165.16 (Plaintiff's Exhibit A), plus the $2,700.00 she is
receiving from the defendant to support the children, and still coming up short $3,274.46
($11,139.62 total expenses attributable to the children per plaintiff's exhibit G, less her
$5,165.16 net income and the $2,700.00 received yearly from the defendant, leaves a net
deficiency of $3,274.46).

Both the children and the plaintiff are entitled to better

treatment from the defendant and from the courts.
(e) Father's Ability to Pay.

In 1978, when the divorce was granted, defendant

agreed to pay a total of $500.00 per month alimony and child support (R-217, 218), and he
had an income of $15,313.40. (R-366).

In other words, he was then able to pay

approximately 4096 of his gross income to support the plaintiff and her children. In 1981,
after receiving cost of living increases bringing his yearly income to $19,000.00 (R-366) he
makes the ridiculous claim that he cannot even afford to pay a total of $225.00 per month
or 14% of his income to support his children. (T-119, 120, 123).
Plaintiff maintains that defendant has demonstrated in the past the ability to pay
$500.00 per month, because he actually paid it at a time when his income was

substantially lower. His income having increased by $3,684.60 represents a 2496· increase
over the three year period, roughly matching the general rise in the cost of living.
Assuming a 24% increase in his ability to support his children, he should be able to
increase his total support by 2596 to $600.00 per month, exactly what was requested by
the plaintiff herein. ($500.00 + 2596 increase = $600.00 or $200.00 per month per child).
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Any increase in defendant's costs occasioned by his remarriage are voluntary
increases willingly accepted by him. Although those circumstances should be considered
by the court (see Openshaw vs. Openshaw, Utah, 639 P.2d.

177), they are not properly

permitted to supplant the primary obligation to take care of his first family. The case of
Beck vs. Jaeger (Ariz., 1979) 604 P .2d. 18,. is instructive on this point. In that case the
trial court had determined that the children's minimum needs were $300.00 per month,
that the father had present earnings of $15,500.00 to $16,500.00 per year, and that the
wife was earning approximately $600.00 per month. (It sounds almost like the situation in
the instant case). Based upon those circumstances, the trial court increased the support
award from $125.00 per child to $225.00 per child per month. Defendant appealed and the
appeals court sustained the trial court, and made the following pertinent observations:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that the cost of living has
substantially increased since 197 3."
"Inasmuch as ex-husband's ability to pay more child support was shown, it
was proper for the trial court, in proceeding on ex-wife's petition for an
increase in child support, to consider the increase in the general cost of living
as a factor in determining the need for increased support payments."
"Other financial obligations are secondary in the court's determination of
ability to pay child support."
"While the earnings of petitioner's present husband were not insubstantial,
that fact had no bearin on the obli ation of etitioner's ex-husband to su ort
his children." Emphasis added •
A very extensive annotation covers the question of modification of child support in
....

89 A.L.R., 2d.

On page 61 the annotator makes the following statement concerning

grounds for increase in payments and costs of support generally:
"It is generally held or recognized that where the cost of supporting
children has substantially increased since the entry of a support decree, an
application for an increase in support payments may be granted, provided the
father has the ability to pay more than the amount originally allowed."
Among a long list of cases cited from 28 states in support of the proposition, the
annotator lists the Utah cases of Craven vs. Craven (1951), 119 Utah 476, 229 P.2d. 301;
Carlton vs. Carlton (1956), 4 Utah 2d. 332, 294 P.2d. 316; and Erickson vs. Erickson 0959),
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8 Utah 2d. 381, 335 P.2d. 618. It is interesting to note that in the Erickson case the exhusband was ea.rning only an adjusted gross income of $11,325.00 per year, and the court
had substantial doubts about the good faith of the ex-wife. Still, the court approved an
increase from $150.00 for each of two children to $225.00 per child.

Under the

circumstances, is not the judicial conscience shocked where Mr. Shaw, earning $19,000.00
per year is permitted to pay only a measly $75.00 per child for each of three children? He
is paying as much for three children as Erickson was paying for one, and earning almost
double the amount. To add insult to injury, he is then allowed by the decree to claim the
three children as dependants for income tax purposes. How unfair can it be???
If the court verily believes that defendant cannot pay an adequate child support out

of current earnings, then the court should award some or all of his share of the proceeds
from the sale of the house to the plaintiff in order to provide an adequate level of
support.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DIVISION OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE
SALE OF THE REAL PROPERTY
APPLICABLE FACTS.

A reading of the decision of the trial court as announced

from the bench, particularly the portion dealing with the credits back and forth to the
plaintiff and defendant for unpaid support, adjustments for costs of fix-up on the real
property, adjustments for rent received by the plaintiff on the property, and etc.,will
demonstrate that the court was utterly confused and, in the process, confused counsel for
both sides. See for example T-179 to 186 where the court attempted to determine the
proper credit to be given for the month of August, 1980. (In his confusion he awarded
defendant $125 credit rather than the proper amount of $25 -- a 500 96 error).
Out of all the confusion, however, the court eventually made findings (R-367, 368),
and entered its order (R-373, 374), to the effect that the plaintiff was entitled to a net
credit of $713.71 (it should be $813.71), which was to be paid first to the plaintiff out of
the proceeds of the sale, and the balance divided between the parties.
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CREDIT TO PLAINTIFF.

After determining that the plaintiff was entitled to

$713.71 for unpaid child support, fix-up costs, driveway repairs, and etc. (R-367, 368, 373,
374), the court then proceeded to dilute the award by one-half -- in effect requiring the
plaintiff to pay herself one-half of the amounts found to be due to her from the
defendant. The court accomplished this feat by ordering that she first be paid $713.71 out
of the proceeds of the sale and that the balance of the funds then be divided between the
parties. (R-374). Since, by virtue of the divorce decree (R-217), plaintiff was entitled to
one-half of the proceeds in any event, and without reference to anything owed to her by
the defendant, it is apparent that by paying her first out of the fund, and then dividing the
balance, one-half of the amount so paid comes out of her share.

For example, let us

suppose that there was $34,000.00 to be divided between them"

(Defendant testified,

T-123, Defendant's Exhibit 6, to approximately $34,000.00 in the account). In that case
each would get $17,000.00. If the parties had divided the fund without intervention from
the court, and if after the distribution, plaintiff had brought an action against the
defendant for unpaid support, and for other claims resulting in a judgment for $713.71,
and if she then levied upon the bank account where the defendant had deposited his
$17,000.00, it is obvious that she would take $713.71 from the account, thereby reducing
the balance to $16,286.29. If she then added the proceeds from the levy to her account
where she had deposited her $17,000.00, she would then have $17,713.71 in her account.
The difference between her account at $17,713.71, and the bank account of the defendant
at $16,286.29 would then be $1,427 .42, exactly double the credit awarded to the plaintiff.
It is apparent that the court intended that plaintiff recover $713.71 from the
defendant.

It is equally apparent that the formula utilized by the court only recovers

one-half that amount, or $356.85Y2. The court should either order that the proceeds be
divided one-half to each party, and the defendant then pay to the plaintiff, out of his
one-half, $713.71, or, in the alternative (which amounts to the same thing), plaintiff
should first be paid $1,427 .42, and the balance then divided between the parties.
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FIX-UP COSTS. The matter of the division of the proceeds from the real property
was heard by the court over the objection of the plaintiff. (T-52, 53). For that reason,
the court, at the conclusion of the trial, allowed the parties an opportunity to submit
affidavits on the question of fix-up costs expended to get the property ready for sale.
(T-179, R-350).

Plaintiff submitted her affidavit (R-352, 353), wherein she claimed a

total of $1,389.61 for which she should be reimbursed.

Defendant thereafter filed his

objection to the claimed expenses (R-348, 349), and plaintiff then filed a supplemental
affidavit wherein she claimed reimbursement of $2,589.61. (R-358, 359). The trial court,
without apparent rhyme nor reason ·disallowed certain items, such as insulation in the
attic, labor contributed by plaintiff's family members, and etc., and only allowed her
$503.93. (R-350, 368).
Plaintiff submits that it would be very time consuming and difficult for this court to
sort through the various claims and counterclaims relative to the fix-up costs. Inasmuch
as there was never an evidentiary hearing on the question, plaintiff was deprived of her
right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. The court should, therefore, remand
this case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of credit to be
allowed plaintiff for fix-up costs and expenses.
POINT V
THE FINDINGS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED
AFTER THE APPEAL HAD BEEN PERFECTED ARE ILLEGAL AND WITHOUT
FOUNDATION.
APPLICABLE FACTS.

For a general review of the facts as they pertain to this

point, please see pages 4 through 9 of the Statement of Facts herein.
LACK OF FOUNDATION. One of defendant's lines of defense to the claims of the
plaintiff was to attack the integrity and motives of the plaintiff's lawyer husband. See
pages 4 through 9 of the Statement of Facts herein. The only witness produced by the
defendant on that point, however, was the parties oldest son Richard, whose testimony
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ultimately amounted to the fact that plaintiff's husband had stated that he was going to
get an adequate child support from the defendant one way or another.

(T-147, 148).

Plaintiff herself testified to the fact that all statements by her husband referred to
getting "it" meaning support, and that he never stated he was going to get the defendant
or break him, etc. (T-154, 155).
Res Adjudicata.

Defendant, himself, therefore, placed the issue of plaintiff's

bona-fides squarely before the court even after the court questioned the wisdom of
involving the parties offspring in the litigation (T-142).i

The court thereafter, in its

findings, conclusions, and order made no ruling one way or the other regarding the
bona-fides of the plaintiff's claims, and declined to award attorney fees to either party
(R-361 to 37 5), in effect finding no merit to the defendant's claim of bad faith.

Where

the parties had an opportunity to present their case and judgment was rendered therein,
the judgment is binding both as to those issues that were tried and to those that were
triable in that proceeding, and the parties are precluded from further litigating the
matter. (Belliston vs. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d. 379). Inasmuch as the court had in effect,
found against the defendant on the issue of bad faith in its original findings, it cannot
thereafter raise the issue again (especially without notice to the plaintiff), and on the
same state of facts make a finding of bad faith as it has done in its Special Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and in its Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause.
(R-455, 477, 478, T-11). The doctrines of res adjudicata and collateral estoppel prevent
the court or the defendant from re-litigating the bona-fides of the plaintiff or her lawyer
husband as was done in the April 5, 1982 hearing.
Court's Rulings Are Contrary to ALL of the Evidence. Plaintiff's counsel of record,
Ronald R. Stanger, at all times relevant herein, was ill with pneumonia and unable to
function effectively (R-417, 480), and hence did not communicate his objections to the
defendant's proposed findings, conclusions and order prior to their submission to the court.
Defendant's counsel submitted them to the court without notice of his intention to do so
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(R-416), even though the court had instructed him to submit them to opposing counsel
for approval. (T-198). The findings, conclusions, and order actually signed by the court
(R-361 to 375) as prepared and submitted by defendant's counsel, contain numerous and
significant provisions that are contrary to the announced decision of the court.

For

instance, in announcing its decision concerning a box of scouting materials which plaintiff
sought to have returned to her the court stated (T-195) that:
"Court's going to direct the plaintiff receive that box with the scouting
equipment. If the defendant has anything in that scouting box that he wants,
he can photograph it within the next months period of time, one month today.
That should be delivered to the plaintiff."
Almost in direct contradiction thereto, defendant's counsel prepared and the court
signed an order as follows:
" ••• defendant is ordered to provide to the plaintiff the Boy Scout materials
which were the plaintiff's personal property, provided, however that either
party may make arrangements to have the Boy Scout items copied within 30
days from the date of this hearing, and make arrangements as to paying the
costs." (R-369, 371, 374).
·
Another for instance:
In stating its decision from the bench, the court observed that the general increase
in the cost of living had increased plaintiff's costs of supporting the minor children. There
was no mention of such in the findings submitted by the defendant's counsel, however.
Many significant implicit issues were not addressed in the findings prepared by defendant's
counsel.

Plaintiff sought to have the findings and conclusions accurately reflect the

decision of the court, and sought to have them specifically rule on significant implicit
issues, and etc. (R-402 to 415).
As a result of Mr. Stanger's illness, it became apparent that the time for appeal
would run before plaintiff could submit her motion to vacate (R-399 to 401), and her
proposed findings, conclusions, and order (R-402 to 415). Therefore, on March 3, 1982, at
the request of and on behalf of Mr. Stanger, plaintiff's lawyer husband Robert Lord
submitted to the court an ex-parte motion and order for extension of time to file the
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appeal. (R-376, 377, 480, et. seq.). The extension was signed by Judge Cornaby on March
3, and filed with the court the same day. (R-378). Contrary to later ruling by the court
(R-456), no hearing time was set when the order was signed (R-481), and the court
specifically, _as late as March 15, refused to set a hearing time in spite of pleas of urgency
by Mr. Lord, acting at the request of Mr. Stanger, who was still ill. (R-481, 463).
Upon the filing of plaintiff's motion to vacate, Mr. Stanger withdrew (R-380, 399),
and Mr. Ronald C. Barker entered his appearance as counsel for the plaintiff, and
requested an oral hearing on plaintiff's motions to vacate and etc. (R-379). Mr. Barker
promptly came down with a severe case of the flu and was absent from his office from
March 16 to March 26, and on various occasions thereafter. (R-465 to 468, 481, 482). On
March 25, while plaintiff's counsel was still absent from his office because of illness,
Judge Cornaby's clerk called and set a hearing time on plaintiff's motions for April .5,
1982, one day past the last day for filing the notice of appeal pursuant to the extension
signed March 3. (R-377, 482). Because he had been absent from the office due to illness,
Mr. Barker reasonably assumed, after returning to work, that (contrary to the fact) the
hearing time had been set by previous counsel, and that the plaintiff and her husband were
aware of it. (R-466, 490).
It is virtually impossible to detail all of the facts and the evidence pertaining to the
question of who knew of what hearing, who failed to advise who of what, and etc., without
incorporating into this brief all of the record and evidence pertaining thereto. Suffice it
to say (a) that plaintiff, on March 3 in good faith obtained an unconditional extension of
time in which to file her notice of appeal to April 4, 1982 (R-378), (b) that she, through
her husband, attempted on April 15 to get her motion to vacate set for hearing and Judge
Cornaby refused to calendar it at that time (R-470, 471, 480, 481), (c) that on March 25,
the court called the office of plaintiff's substitute counsel who was absent from the office
because of illness and set the hearing time for April 5, 1982, one day after the last day in
which plaintiff could file her notice of appeal (R-37 8), (d) that plaintiff's counsel was
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confused and believed that previous counsel had set the hearing and that plaintiff was
aware of the scheduled date (R-466, 490), (e) that neither plaintiff nor her lawyer husband
were aware that the matter had been scheduled (R-466, 481, 483), (f) that neither
plaintiff, her husband, nor her counsel deliberately failed to notify the court or opposing
counsel that the notice of appeal had been filed on March 2 (R-466, 483), (g) that plaintiff
had no reasonable reason to believe she need give the court or opposing counsel any
special notice of the filing of the appeal, (h) that contrary to the ruling of the court
(R-456) the court did not schedule the hearing at the time the extension was signed on
March 3, nor could plaintiff's husband have been aware of any supposed telephone calls to
opposing counsel and etc., in order to clear the date (R-480 to 483), and (i) That the
alleged call from the court to clear the date was, in fact never made on March 3, as the
record of long distance telephone calls shows no calls to Mr. Thorne's office in Brigham
City. (R-

).

A careful reading of the record beginning on page 416 to the end will amply
demonstrate that the special findings of the court (R-473 to 478), the supplemental order
on order to show cause (R-453 to 455), the rulings (R-456, 457), refusing to give any
consideration to plaintiff's objections to entry of the said findings and order (R-451 to
454, 459 to 460), and all proceedings of the court in relation to the hearing on April 5, are
totally contrary to the evidence, without foundation, and constitute a very significant
abuse of discretion on the part of the court. At the very least, there is sufficient blame
to be apportioned to the court itself (for the way in which it handled the scheduling of
plaintiff's motion to vacate) which contributed to the confusion of all involved on
plaintiff's side, that plaintiff, the most innocent of all, ought not to be penalized by an
award of attorney fees when she does not even have sufficient income to support the
minor children of the defendant as it is.
Likewise, the very damaging statements made by the court in its findings, order, and
rulings pertaining to Mr. Lord, who is neither a party to the action, nor an attorney of
record, and therefore wholly defenseless in this matter, should be vacated and set aside.
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VIOLATION OF RULES OF PRACTICE.

The Special Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, and the Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause on their face,
were signed by the court in violation of Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice, which require
that proposed orders be served upon opposing counsel and that counsel shall have five days
in which to object. The mailing certificate of the special findings (R-479), and of the
supplemental order (R-455) certifies that copies were mailed to plaintiff's counsel on
April 14. The orders were signed by the court just two days later on April 16, the same
day that plaintiff submitted her objections thereto.

(R-451).

In spite of plaintiff's

request for an oral hearing on her objections (R-451), the court summarily rejected her
request (R-456, 457).

The entire ruling (R-456, 457), is based upon false premises as

follows:
(a) The first sentence stating that plaintiff's objections were received April 19 is in
error and is evident by simply looking at the date stamped thereon by the clerk of the
court April 16. (R-451).
(b) The hearing on April 5 was not set at the specific instance and request of the
plaintiff, nor did she willfully choose to stay away from the hearing or to notify the court
or counsel that she did not intend to proceed with her motion. (R-466, 481, 483).
(c) The special findings of fact and conclusions of law do not correctly reflect the
findings, and conclusions of the court. For instance, the findings and order prepared by
defendant's counsel depart entirely from anything fairly to be implied from the proceedings of April 5. Paragraph one of the conclusions of law (R-477), and paragraph one of the
order (R-454), illegally attempt to modify the extension of time for the filing of the
notice of appeal and condition it to require plaintiff to disgorge certain funds from the
sale of the parties home in North Ogden. (R-454, 457). An examination of the clerks
minute entry (R-458), and the relevant portions of the transcript of the hearing (small
transcript 10 to 12), reveal a complete dearth of any such finding or ruling by the court.
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(d) The statement that the court set a trial date of April 5 at the time it signed the
extension order is wholly contrary to all evidence adduced, as is the statement that Mr·
Lord was present, consented to the date, or that Carmon Long called opposing counsel in
Mr. Lord's presence at that time.
(e) The finding that "it is clear that all parties knew of the date and time of the
hearing by either personal notice or notice by phone" is contrary to the evidence.
With such a significant failure of the factual basis for the court's ruling it is
abundantly clear that the failure to abide by Rule 2.9 was highly prejudicial to the
plaintiff, and constitutes a material a·nd significant abuse of discretion by the court.
Certainly plaintiff ought not to be penalized by an award of attorney fees, nor
should her husband should not be libeled without opportunity for them to defend
themselves.
THE TRIAL COURT LOST ITS JURISDICTION AFTER THE FILING OF THE
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL ON APRIL 2, 1982.

Plaintiff filed her motion to

vacate pursuant to Rule 60, (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on March 23 (R-399). On
April 2, she filed her notice of appeal (R-419).

At that point the trial court lost all

jurisdiction to proceed with a hearing on plaintiff's motions, or to make any supplemental
orders or findings relative thereto.
"The general rule is that an appeal or writ of error, when duly perfected,
divests the trial court of jurisdiction of the cause and transfers such
jurisdiction to the appellate court where it remains until the appellate
proceeding terminates and the trial court regains jurisdiction.
Having lost
jurisdiction pending an appeal, the lower court may not proceed with the trial,
hear a writ of error coram nobis requesting permission to withdraw a plea of
guilty, permit intervention, allow amendments, or entertain a bill to review
the judgment". 4 Am. Jur .2d. Appeal and Error, section 352.
Once jurisdiction is divested by the taking of the appeal, the parties cannot, even by
consent, reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal
while it is still pending in the appellate court. Kinard vs. Jordan, 17 5 Cal. 13, 164 P. 891.
To this same effect, see the case of Epps vs.
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

holding that an appeal stays any further action in the court below relating to the order
appealed from, and an order modifying the order on appeal by increasing a required
undertaking was void.
In the case of Mamer vs. Superior Court (Cal., 1940), 103 P.2d. 961, the supreme
court of California had before it a situation on all fours with the instant case. Judgment
had been entered against the plaintiffs by the trial court. Twelve days after entry of the
judgment, plaintiffs filed their motion to set aside the judgment, and on the same day,
filed a notice of appeal. The trial court refused to hear the motion on the ground that it
had lost jurisdiction because of the appeal. The supreme court affirmed. Likewise see in
the case of Goodwin Foundation vs. Riggs, et. al. (Florida, 1979), 374 So.2d. 1018, where
the court held that "The trial court has no authority after a notice of appeal has been
filed to change

th~

status of a case or to interfere with the rights of a party under the

judgment. The trial court retains jurisdiction of the cause only to correct the record and
it may not take any action affecting the subject matter of the appeal." (Emphasis added).
The Idaho court has also held that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over the
cause once an appeal has been taken. In the case of Dolbeer vs. Harten {1966), 417 P .2d.
407, the court held that having lost jurisdiction pending appeal the lower court could not
allow amendments and that it was error to enter a substituted and supplemental decree
after the appeal had been taken.
In the case of Smith vs. Kimball, (Utah, 1930), 280 P. 588, the Utah court recognized
the effect of an appeal on the jurisdiction of the trial court. In that matter, after the
appeal had been perfected, the appellee brought a contempt action in the district court to
enforce the injunction, and held the appellant in contempt. The supreme court held that
the district court had exceeded its jurisdiction where the appeal had been perfected, and
supersedeas given. The court held that the trial court was wholly without jurisdiction to
do anything at all pending the appeal. In the instant case, no supersedeas has been filed,
but as was held in the case of Hidden Meadows vs. Dee Mill, et. al., (Utah, 1979), 500
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P.2d.

1244, a supersedeas is not required of the plaintiff except for the purpose of

preventing the lower court from taking action to enforce the judgment as it stood before
the appeal. For all other intents and purposes, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction
upon the filing of the notice of appeal.,

CONCLUSION
(1) The alimony awarded to the plaintiff by the decree of divorce was $125.00

payable for three years. Since the amount payable can be calculated with precision, and
the decree does not provide for any contingencies upon which it would be terminated or
upon which the amount payable could be extended, it is an award of alimony in gross, or a
lump sume

Utah, along with the great majority of states that have considered the

question, has recognized the difference between permanent alimony indefinite in amount,
and alimony payable for a limited time or lump sum. The latter (lump sum) award is a
final judgment and a vested right of the plaintiff just like any other money judgment,
constitutes a lien upon real property, cannot be modified by the court, and does not
terminate upon the remarriage of the plaintiff.
Regardless of what the intention of the parties may have been, they entered into a
stipulation which provided simply for the payment of a fixed amount of alimony for three
years. The stipulation was incorporated into the findings and the decree verbatim. There
is no question that the judgment of the court did not, and was not intended to contain any
provision that the alimony terminate upon remarriage. Since any presumed error would,
therefore, be a judicial error and not a clerical error the decree cannot be modified
pursuant to Rule 60 (a). By the same token, since it is a judicial error (if it is error at all),
it must be corrected by a timely motion under Rule 60 (b).

The defendant's motion

coming more than two years after entry of the decree was not timely under the rule and
the alimony provision is fixed, final, and subject to no modification by either the plaintiff,
the defendant, or the court.
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The order of the trial court modifying the decree to eliminate the alimony upon
remarriage was illegal, improper, an abuse of discretion, and beyond the jurisdiction of
the court. Plaintiff should be granted judgment for the unpaid alimony in the amount of
$1,875.00 plus interest on each payment from the date it was due to the date of judgment.
(2) The decree of divorce awarded the plaintiff custody of the then five minor
children and provided for payment of $7 5.00 per month per child for their support.
Plaintiff was also awarded the possession and use of the home as shelter for herself and
the minor children until she remarried.

In July of 1980, plaintiff remarried, thereby

triggering the requirement that she sell the home and divide the equity with the
defendant. In conformity with that requirement, with four minor children still living with
her (including Neil who was about to turn 17), and with the expectation that the oldest
child Rick, who was then 21 years old would also be living with her, plaintiff purchased a
home in Salt Lake City.
Plaintiff did not consent to the move by Neil into the home of his father, and did not
agree to any substituted payment of the required child support for Neil.

Even though

plaintiff no longer had to purchase food and clothing for Neil, the bulk of the expense
attributable to him continued just the same. The total support for the three remaining
minors, even with Neil's portion apportioned to them would be only $300.00 per month, or
an inadequate $100.00 per month per child. To deny plaintiff judgment for the paltry sum
of $900.00 support for Neil which accrued between the time he moved in with his father
and the time he reached his majority works a substantial injustice upon the plaintiff with
no compelling equity requiring relief for the father.
The plaintiff is, under Utah law, and the law of the great majority of the states,
entitled, as a matter of law, to receive the support for Neil, even though he was fully
supported by the defendant, until such time as the court effects a modification
eliminating it. The payments that had accrued prior to the trial in December, 1981, had
vested with the plaintiff and the court could make no order eliminating those vested
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accruels. It could only make an order eliminating the support in the future. Plaintiff is
entitled to judgment against the defendant for the sum of $900.QO plus interest, from the
date each payment was due to the date of judgment.
(3) There is no question but what the award of $75.00 per month per child is
inadequate by any standard. The evidence fully demonstrated the need for an increase in
the level of support and demonstrated the ability of the defendant to pay it. In 1978,
when the divorce was granted, defendant was earning $15, 313.40 per year and paid a total
of $500.00 or 3996 of his income to support the plaintiff and the minor children. Even
though he had remarried, he was earning at the time of trial in December of 1981,
approximately $19,000.00 and could well pay at least the same $500.00 per month to
support the three minors remaining with the plaintiff that he had earlier paid at the time
of the divorce. He had received a 2496 cost of living increase in his wages, and the overall
cost of living had gone up 3096, reducing plaintiff's child support, in 1978 dollars to the
equivalent of $52.50, a mere pittance.
The plaintiff proved a sufficient change of circumstances, including her increased
expense as a result of the requirement that she sell the house upon her remarriage, the
overall increase in the cost of living, the increased costs of raising the boys as they grew
older, the inadequacy of the award, and the overall unfairness of allowing defendant to
pay merely $7 5.00 per month and claim the children as dependants for income tax
purposes when the plaintiff was spending in excess of $300.00 per month to support them.
Defendant was spending only 1496 of his income on their support while plaintiff was
spending 16596 of hers.
While the court should be very wary of changing property settlement awards and
etc., the provisions for support and alimony should be readily subject to modification
because

of the rapidly changing and unforseen circumstances.

Plaintiff should be

awarded support in the amount of $200.00 per month per child, particularly when the long
period of time since the plaintiff's motion to increase the support is considered.
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The

provisions awarding the right to either parent to claim the children for tax purposes
should be eliminated and the parties left to their own devices vis-a-vis the Internal
Revenue Service.
(4) As was pointed out in the discussion of Point IV above, the award of $713.71 to
the plaintiff should have been $813.71, and was diluted by one-half as a result of the
courts order that she be paid first out of the proceeds of the sale. Inasmuch as she was
entitled to one-half of the proceeds in her own right, the requirement that she be paid
first, in effect, required her to pay herself one-half of the judgment which she was
entitled to from the defendant. Plaintiff should be awarded $1,627 .42 from the proceeds
of the sale before any division of the equity is effected.
(5) The court proceeded to adjudicate the division of the proceeds from the sale of
the house over the objections of the plaintiff that that issue was not properly and timely
raised before the court.

For that reason, affidavits were submitted after the trial

relative to the actual expenses, credits and offsets to which the parties should be entitled
for fix-up costs, or other expenses incurred by them which improved the value of the
house.

The court arbitrarily and without apparent rhymn or reason allowed certain

expenses and denied others. The court denied plaintiff's claim for labor performed by her
family, friends, and fiance, and denied her claim for insulation in the attic on the ground
that it was not installed directly with a view to preparing the house for sale.
Such denials are improper. Just as she should be allowed to recover the increased
value of the house (at least to the extent of her costs) if she had added a room, built a
patio, and etc., which increased the value of the house, she should be allowed to recover
the costs of the insulation which, in this energy conscious era, obviously increased the
value of the home for resale.
Likewise she should be allowed the value of the labor which was performed by her
friends and family. If the value was increased by their labor, which it obviously was, why
should the defendant be granted a free ride. The court should grant plaintiff judgment for
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an additional sum of $2,085.68 ($2,589.61 requested by the plaintiff less the $503.93
already awarded by the court).
At the very least, this case should be remanded back to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of credit to be allowed plaintiff for fix-up costs and
expenses5
(6) All orders, rulings, findings, conclusions, and etc., pertaining to the hearing of
April 5, 1982, coming after the appeal had been perfected in this matter are invalid and
should be vacated as beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and because they are wholly
unsupported by the evidence.

Plaintiff was not aware that the said hearing had been

scheduled and did not deliberately fail to show up for the hearing. There is more blame
for the mix-up to be apportioned to the trial court, because of the way he handled the
scheduling to the plaintiff's motion, than there is to be affixed to the plaintiff and she,
the most innocent of all concerned ought not to be saddled with a judgment for attorney
fees when she does not have adequate monies to support the minor children as it is.
The judgment for attorney fees was not granted as an equitable measure to provide
the defendant with the means to prosecute his claims or defend his position.

It was

obviously awarded as a punishment and penalty for her presumed discourtesy to the court
and the defendant. The irony is that the defendant was no worse off for plaintiff's failure
to appear for the hearing than he would have been had she actually appeared. Because she
did not appear, she lost on all counts. How could he expect any more than that if she had
been there? Had she been there she might have won on one or more of the issues she was
pressing and defendant, therefore, could very well have been worse off had she actually
appeared for the hearing.
And finally, much that is contained in the special findings and conclusions, the
supplemental order, and in the rulings of the court are highly prejudicial to the reputation
of plaintiff's husband, Robert L. Lord, who is not a party to the action, and not even an
attorney therein. The court had no jurisdiction over him and could not properly make any
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judgment concerning him. The question of good faith and etc., was not an issue which the
plaintiff, her husband, nor her counsel could reasonably have foreseen would be involved
in the April 5 hearing and they were, therefore, unfairly deprived of their day in court on
those issues. If said orders and rulings are not vacated and set aside by this court, the
matter should, at least, be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of plaintiff's good faith and the award of attorney fees.
(7) And finally it is apparent that the prosecution of this matter has imposed a
great hardship upon the plaintiff and caused her to incur attorney fees and other costs
which she could ill afford to pay. Much of what plaintiff has sought in this case she was
entitled to as a matter of law, such as the alimony, and the child support for Neil. The
balance of her claims are reasonable and were instituted as a result of defendant's
stubborn refusal to shoulder his fair share of the burdon of raising their minor children.
Much of the expense has come about as a result of the insistance of the defendant's
counsel upon attacking the integrity of the plaintiff and her husband, and as a result of
the improper handling of proceedings by Mr. Thorne and the court after the trial.
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney fees and cost for all matters

aris~ng

since

the trial in the amount of $4,500.00. If the court cannot fix an amount at this time, the
matter should be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of
attorney fees.
(8) In total then, plaintiff should be awarded judgment on her various claims as
follows:

$ 1,875.00

(a) Unpaid alimony
(b) Unpaid child support for Neil

900.00

(c) Credit as awarded by the trial court

713.71

(d) Additional credit to correct trial court error
regarding apportionment of credit
for the month of August

100.00
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(e) Additional credit for fix-up costs

2,085.68

(f) Attorney fees and costs

4,500.00
$10,174.39

TOTAL

The court should either order the proceeds from the sale of the house equally
divided, and the plaintiff then paid her judgment out of the defendant's half, or she should
be paid $20,348.78 (plus interest) and the balance then divided equally between the
parties. Either formula arrives at the same result.
Plaintiff should, of course, also be awarded an increase in child support to $200.00
per month per child.
Respectfully submitted,
Lowell V., Summerhays
Attorney for Plaintiff
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 355-5200
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